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Abstract 
After almost four years of negotiation and 20 years of academic and political debate, the Council 
Regulation setting up the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) was approved in October 2017, in 
the framework of the enhanced cooperation established in April 2017. The creation of a European 
prosecuting authority is a historic achievement for the European Union, especially when a wave of 
populism – as epitomised by Brexit – has undermined the process of integration. 
The EPPO Regulation is probably the most ambitious instrument of EU law adopted so far, since it 
creates the first EU body with direct powers regarding individuals in the field of criminal law. The Office 
will be empowered to investigate and prosecute crimes affecting the financial interests of the EU. 
Recent calls, including those from Commission President Juncker and French President Macron, for an 
extension of the EPPO’s powers to cases of cross-border terrorism bode well for the likely acceptance 
of this Office in the EU in the years to come. Yet the final text of the Regulation raises several concerns, 
such as those relating to the impact of supranational investigations on human rights and, more 
generally, about the expected effectiveness of the Office, given its cumbersome and multi-layered 
architecture.  
This paper looks at the main provisions of the Regulation and the challenges it poses, focusing on the 
structure, powers, and competence of the EPPO. It also considers the judicial review of its acts, the 
protection of the rights of suspects and accused persons, and relations between the Office and its 
partners. The analysis shows that the Commission’s innovative vision of a centralised prosecution at EU 
level, with its echoes of federalism, has been watered down in negotiations in the Council and replaced 
with the usual intergovernmental, collegiate vision that underpins numerous EU judicial cooperation 
structures and instruments. 
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1. Introduction 
After almost four years of negotiation and 20 years of academic and political debate, the 
Council Regulation setting up the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) was approved in 
October 2017, in the framework of the enhanced cooperation established in April 2017.1 When 
the Commission tabled its proposal2 for a Regulation on the EPPO in July 2013, it argued that 
offences affecting the Union’s financial interests (‘PIF offences’)3 significantly damaged the EU 
budget, yet neither member states nor EU bodies (namely 
Eurojust, Europol, OLAF) could tackle them in a satisfactory and 
efficient way. A European body competent to investigate and 
prosecute such illegal conducts was therefore deemed 
necessary.  
Since the very beginning, negotiations about this body have 
been difficult. A group of national parliaments first expressed 
the objection that the text did not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. The Commission 
was forced to review its proposal and decided to maintain it, confirming its views on the need 
to establish the EPPO.4 Nevertheless, the unanimous adoption of the text did not turn out to 
be feasible. In the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 8 December 2016, Sweden mentioned 
that it would not take part in the establishment of the EPPO and the Council formally registered 
the absence of unanimity in the General Affairs meeting of 7 February 2017.5 Thus, in April 
2017, 16 member states – later joined by another four – notified the European Parliament, the 
                                                     
1 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the 
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’), OJ L283, 31.10.2017 (hereinafter: ‘EPPO 
Regulation’ or simply ‘Regulation’). Unless otherwise specified, the provisions mentioned in the footnotes below 
are Articles and Recitals of this Regulation. 
2 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, COM(2013) 
534 final, 17 July 2013. 
3 PIF stands for “protection des intérêts financiersʺ. 
4 See the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the national 
parliaments on the review of the proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with Protocol No 2, COM(2013) 851 
final, 27 November 2013.  
5 Giuffrida (2017a). See the press release of the General Affairs Council meeting of 7 February 2017, no. 48/17 
(www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2017/2/47244654495_en.pdf). 
The EPPO will investigate and 
prosecute crimes affecting the 
financial interests of the EU. 
It is the first EU body with direct 
powers vis-à-vis individuals in the 
field of criminal law. 
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Council and the Commission of their wish to establish enhanced cooperation on the 
establishment of the EPPO, in accordance with Article 86(1) TFEU.6 The 20 member states 
reached agreement on the final text of the Regulation in June 
2017, and the European Parliament gave its consent in 
October 2017.7 Presently, Denmark, Ireland, the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, Poland, Malta, Hungary, and the 
Netherlands do not participate in the EPPO. Although the new 
Dutch government will “make a decision during its term in 
office on when the Netherlands will join the EPPO”,8 the initial 
non-participation of this country has made it impossible to 
establish the EPPO in the same place as Eurojust, although the 
sharing of premises between the two entities was strongly supported during the negotiations.9 
The Office, which will become operational in 2020-21, will thus be located in Luxembourg.10  
Against this backdrop, this paper sheds light on some key aspects of the EPPO and its main 
challenges.11 First, the structure and powers of the Office are discussed (section 2), before 
addressing its competence (section 3). The focus then shifts to the protection of individuals’ 
human rights concerned by the activities of the EPPO (section 4) and to the judicial review of 
acts and decisions of the Office (section 5). Finally, section 6 deals with the relations of the 
EPPO with its partners. Section 7 concludes, summing up the main findings of the analysis.  
2. Structure and powers  
The Regulation defines the EPPO as “an indivisible Union body 
operating as one single Office with a decentralised structure”12 
and “organised at a central level and at a decentralised level”.13 
                                                     
6 Council doc. 7761/17, 3 April 2017, p. 1.  
7 See the press release of the European Parliament plenary session of 5 October 2017 (www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
news/en/press-room/20171002IPR85127/ep-green-light-for-setting-up-eu-prosecutor-to-fight-fraud-against-eu-
funds). According to Article 86 TFEU, the European Parliament could not act as co-legislator in the special 
legislative procedure for the adoption of the EPPO Regulation; it was only required to give its consent to the text 
unanimously agreed by the Council. 
8 Coalition Agreement between the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, the Christian Democratic Alliance, 
Democrats '66 and the Christian Union, entitled “Confidence in the Future” and released on 10 October 2017 
(www.government.nl/latest/news/2017/10/10/government-presents-coalition-agreement), p. 9.  
9 Among others, also the European Parliament had submitted that “it would be best for the EPPO and Eurojust to 
operate in the same location” (see the Resolution of 5 October 2016 on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
and Eurojust (2016/2750(RSP)), para. 10). 
10 Recital 121 and Article 106(2). See also the fact sheet released by the Commission in June 2017 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1551_en.htm).  
11 Some issues are therefore not addressed in this paper, such as the data protection regime envisaged in the 
Regulation. For a more detailed analysis of a previous version of the Regulation, largely similar to the final one, 
see Giuffrida (2017b), whereupon this note draws. 
12 Article 8(1). 
13 Article 8(2). 
The establishment of the EPPO has 
been long debated and was 
eventually agreed by means of 
enhanced cooperation. Denmark, 
Ireland, the UK, Sweden, Poland, 
Malta, Hungary, and the 
Netherlands do not currently 
participate in the EPPO. 
The EPPO is organised both at a 
central level (Luxembourg) and at 
a decentralised level (member 
states). 
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The central level consists of a Central Office composed of the College, Permanent Chambers, 
the European Chief Prosecutor, his/her deputies and the European Prosecutors.14 The 
decentralised structure consists of (at least two) European Delegated Prosecutors located in 
the member states.15 The following figure represents the structure of the EPPO. 
Figure 1. The structure of the EPPO 
 
Note: ECP: European Chief Prosecutor; DCP: Deputy Chief Prosecutor; EP: European Prosecutor; EDP: European Delegated 
Prosecutor. N.B.: in exceptional circumstances, the supervising EP can also be from a different member state than the EDP. 
Source: Giuffrida (2017b), p. 14. 
 
The European Chief Prosecutor is the head of the EPPO, 
organises the work of the Office, directs its activities and takes 
decisions in accordance with the Regulation and rules of 
procedure.16 The College, which includes the European Chief 
Prosecutor and one European Prosecutor per member state17 
is responsible for the general oversight of the Office’s activities 
and for taking decisions in strategic matters and on general 
issues arising from individual cases, but is not involved in taking operational decisions in 
individual cases.18  
                                                     
14 Article 8(3).  
15 Articles 8(4) and 13(2). 
16 Article 11(1). 
17 Article 9(1). 
18 Article 9(2). 
Each member state appoints one 
European Prosecutor to the 
central Office of the EPPO. All 
European Prosecutors make up the 
College, which oversees the 
EPPO’s activities. 
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The Permanent Chambers, to be set up by the College, will be 
chaired by the European Chief Prosecutor or one of the 
deputies, or a European Prosecutor appointed as Chair, and 
have two additional members.19 In addition to the permanent 
members, the European Prosecutor who supervises an 
investigation or a prosecution participates in the deliberations 
of the Permanent Chamber.20 The Permanent Chambers direct and monitor the investigations 
and prosecutions conducted by the European Delegated Prosecutors,21 and ensure the 
coordination of investigations and prosecutions in cross-border cases.22  
The European Prosecutors, on behalf of the Permanent 
Chamber and in compliance with its instructions, “supervise the 
investigations and prosecutions for which the European 
Delegated Prosecutors handling the case in their Member State 
of origin are responsible”.23 When necessary, they can 
intervene and give instructions on investigations and 
prosecution matters to the European Delegated Prosecutors.24 
Since the legal systems of member states are still very different 
when it comes to criminal law, “it is clear that only a prosecutor with his or her background in 
a given legal system will be able to know exactly what actions are most appropriate and efficient 
in that given state”.25 Thus, the European Prosecutors will function as liaising channels of 
information between the Permanent Chambers and the European Delegated Prosecutors.26  
                                                     
19 Article 10(1). According to the same provisions, the internal rules of the EPPO determine the number of 
Permanent Chambers, and their composition, as well as the division of competences between the Chambers. 
20 Article 10(9), which also lists the cases where the supervising European Prosecutor does not have the right to 
vote. On the supervising European Prosecutors, see immediately below in the text.  
21 Article 10(2).  
22 Ibid. 
23 Article 12(1) (emphasis added). 
24 Recital 23. 
25 Intervention of Ivan Korčok, President-in-Office of the Council during the debate of the European Parliament of 
4 October 2016, transcript available at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference= 
20161004&secondRef=TOC&language=en (emphasis added). In exceptional circumstances, the supervising 
European Prosecutor can be from another member state than that of the European Delegated Prosecutor (see 
Article 12(2)).  
26 Article 12(5). 
The Permanent Chambers of the 
central Office in Luxembourg 
monitor and direct investigations 
and coordinate the EPPO’s 
activities in cross-border cases. 
On behalf of the Permanent 
Chamber, the European 
Prosecutors supervise the 
investigations and prosecutions 
carried out by the European 
Delegated Prosecutors of their 
member state of origin. 
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At the decentralised level, the European Delegated Prosecutors 
are responsible for the investigations and prosecutions and 
follow the directions and instructions of the Permanent 
Chamber in charge of the case, as well as the instructions from 
the supervising European Prosecutor.27 They are also 
responsible for bringing a case to judgment.28 The European 
Delegated Prosecutors act on behalf of the EPPO in their 
respective member states and have the same powers as 
national prosecutors in respect of investigations, prosecutions 
and bringing cases to judgment, in addition to the specific powers conferred on them by the 
EPPO Regulation.29 According to Article 30(1), member states must indeed ensure that 
European Delegated Prosecutors may order or request, in cases of serious offences (i.e. 
punishable by a maximum penalty of at least four years’ imprisonment), some investigative 
measures, which include search and seizure, freezing of instrumentalities or proceeds of crime 
and telecommunications interceptions. 
The European Delegated Prosecutors may also order or request arrest or pre-trial detention in 
accordance with the national law applicable in similar domestic cases and, if necessary, they 
can issue (or request the competent authority to issue) a European Arrest Warrant.30 They may 
also exercise functions as national prosecutors to the extent that this does not prevent them 
from fulfilling their obligations under the EPPO Regulation.31 The peculiar status of the 
European Delegated Prosecutors is usually described as being “double hat”32 and raises 
pressing questions about whether they could really be “expected to independently serve two 
masters”.33 
Furthermore, where cross-border cases necessitate measures to be undertaken in a member 
state other than the state of the European Delegated Prosecutor handling the case, the latter 
must assign the case to a European Delegated Prosecutor located in the member state where 
that measure will be carried out (‘assisting European Delegated Prosecutor’).34 Evidence 
collected abroad must not be deemed inadmissible in the trial “on the mere ground that the 
                                                     
27 Article 13(1), second indent. In exceptional circumstances, the supervising European Prosecutor may take a 
reasoned decision to conduct the investigation personally, after having obtained the approval of the competent 
Permanent Chamber (Article 28(4)).  
28 Article 13(1), third indent. 
29 Article 13(1), first indent.  
30 Article 33(1) and (2). 
31 Article 13(3). 
32 See, among the many, Ligeti and Simonato (2013), p. 15; Weyembergh and Brière (2016), p. 12. 
33 Satzger (2015), p. 74. This author also wonders: “Would the Delegated Prosecutor really act objectively and 
openly against his superior or also against colleagues within the internal structure? Can he really be independent 
if he wants to continue a career in the national justice system and needs positive evaluations insofar?” (ibid.). 
34 Article 31(1). 
In the member states participating 
in the EPPO, investigations and 
prosecutions are carried out by the 
European Delegated Prosecutors, 
who follow the directions and 
instructions of the Permanent 
Chamber and of the supervising 
European Prosecutor. 
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evidence was gathered in another Member State or in accordance with the law of another 
Member State”.35  
Finally, when the European Delegated Prosecutor considers 
the investigation to be completed, he or she must submit a 
report to the supervising European Prosecutor, containing a 
summary of the case and a draft decision on how to handle the 
case (i.e. bring it to judgment, dismiss it, etc.).36 These 
documents, accompanied if necessary by the assessment of 
the supervising European Prosecutor,37 must then be 
forwarded to the competent Permanent Chamber, which 
decides whether the case will be brought to judgment, 
referred to national prosecuting authorities,38 dismissed39 or 
concluded by means of simplified prosecution procedures provided by national law.40 If the 
European Delegated Prosecutor proposes to bring the case to judgment, however, the 
Permanent Chamber has a limited margin of discretion: on the one hand, it cannot decide to 
dismiss the case; on the other hand, if it does not take a decision within 21 days,41 the decision 
proposed by the European Delegated Prosecutor will be considered to have been accepted.42  
In principle, the trial following the investigations of the EPPO 
will take place in the member state of the European Delegated 
Prosecutor that handled the case, namely the member state 
where investigations have been carried out.43 A case must be 
initiated and handled by a European Delegated Prosecutor 
from the member state where “the focus of the criminal activity 
is or, if several connected offences within the competences of 
the EPPO have been committed, the Member State where the 
bulk of the offences has been committed”.44 However, the 
Permanent Chamber can decide to deviate from such a rule, in 
                                                     
35 Article 37(1) (emphasis added).  
36 Article 35(1).  
37 ibid. 
38 Article 34. The case will be referred to national authorities either when the offence under investigation does 
not fall (anymore) within the competence of the EPPO or when the impact on the Union’s financial interests is 
limited (less than €100,000) and there is no need to investigate or to prosecute the case at Union level (see Article 
34(1)-(3)).  
39 Article 39. The case will be dismissed where prosecution has become impossible because of a number of reasons 
listed in Article 39(1), spanning from the death or insanity of the suspect to the lack of evidence.  
40 Article 40.  
41 Since it cannot take the decision to dismiss the case, the Permanent Chamber will at least be entitled to 
“postpone it, [e.g.] by asking for further evidence” (Council doc. 15057/16, 5 December 2016, p. 4).  
42 Article 36(1) and (2).  
43 Article 36(3).  
44 Article 26(4) (emphasis added). 
Decisions on prosecutions are 
taken by the Permanent 
Chambers, upon the suggestion of 
the European Delegated 
Prosecutors.  
The Permanent Chamber cannot 
drop the case if the European 
Delegated Prosecutor proposes to 
bring it to prosecution. 
The trial following the 
investigations of the EPPO takes 
place in the member state of the 
European Delegated Prosecutor 
handling the case.  
The Regulation lists, in hierarchical 
order, some criteria allowing the 
Permanent Chamber to choose a 
different member state. 
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accordance with some criteria hierarchically listed in the Regulation,45 and initiate an 
investigation or a prosecution in another member state than that of the focus of the criminal 
activity. The choice of the legislator to spell out and order the criteria to allocate jurisdiction is 
certainly welcome, since it helps to reduce the risks of forum shopping attached to the 
existence of a European prosecuting authority coping with 20 different legal systems. Yet the 
lack of adequate judicial review on the matter leaves room for criticism, as argued in section 5 
below. 
2.1 The balancing act in the Regulation 
The text produced by the Council has put forward a multi-level, complex and at first sight rather 
bureaucratic system of European prosecution with clear and strong intergovernmental 
elements as regards the structure, composition and decision-making underpinning the 
activities of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. Although the investigations are mostly 
carried out on the ground by the European Delegated Prosecutors, central to the function of 
the EPPO are however the Permanent Chambers, which operate in a collegiate manner and 
involve in their decisions members from the states where investigations take place. This move, 
which seems to have left behind the paramount need to 
establish a prosecuting authority capable of taking swift 
decisions during the investigations,46 is a clear signal to ensure 
ownership of the process by member states.47 Yet the EPPO 
must be independent, i.e. its members must act in the interest 
of the Union as a whole and neither seek nor take instructions 
from any person external to the EPPO, any member state or 
any EU entity.48 Already envisaged in the Commission’s 
proposal,49 the independence of the Office was a sticking point 
during the negotiations, since the status of prosecutors in domestic legal systems varies 
throughout the EU. One of the reasons justifying the current non-participation of the 
Netherlands in the enhanced cooperation is precisely the independence of the Office – a 
feature running counter to a fundamental principle of the Dutch legal system, where the public 
prosecution service follows the (general, and sometimes specific) instructions of the Minister 
of Justice, who is in turn accountable to the national Parliament.50  
If the final text does not depart from the Commission’s draft as far as the independence of the 
Office is concerned, it should be noted that the Commission had conceived of a rather different 
structure for the EPPO. In the Commission’s proposal, the EPPO only consisted of a European 
                                                     
45 These criteria are: “(a) the place of the suspect’s or accused person’s habitual residence; (b) the nationality of 
the suspect or accused person; (c) the place where the main financial damage has occurred” (ibid.; see also Article 
36(3) EPPO Regulation).  
46 See, among the many, Weyembergh and Brière (2016), p. 15.  
47 See also Satzger (2015), pp. 75-76.  
48 Article 6(1).  
49 Article 5 of the Commission’s proposal.  
50 See Zwiers (2011), pp. 64–65; Geelhoed (2016), pp. 96-98. 
The complex and multi-level 
structure of the EPPO risks 
undermining the effectiveness of 
its activities. It also shows the 
inclination of member states to 
preserve their sovereignty in the 
field of criminal law as much as 
possible.  
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Public Prosecutor, his/her deputies and staff as well as European Delegated Prosecutors 
located in the member states.51 The EPPO investigations and prosecutions would still have been 
carried out by the European Delegated Prosecutors, under the direction and supervision of the 
European Public Prosecutor only, without further layers such as the Permanent Chambers and 
the supervising European Prosecutors.52  
The Commission had thus put forward a centralised, hierarchical and vertical model of 
European prosecution, which member states did not accept. On the contrary, they found an 
agreement on a collegiate structure, in which the European Delegated Prosecutors will remain 
the kingpins of the investigations, to be carried out mostly in accordance with national law. 
Whether and to what extent Permanent Chambers will be able or willing to go against the 
decisions suggested by the European Delegated Prosecutors, who are more acquainted than 
the members of the Permanent Chambers with the legal systems where investigations are 
conducted, remains to be seen. Splitting the level of regulation of the activities of the EPPO 
(mainly national law) and the level on which decisions are 
adopted (Permanent Chamber) can in fact lead to a catch-22 
situation. Can the goal of guaranteeing homogenous and 
effective investigations and prosecutions against PIF offences 
be effectively reached if the nuts and bolts of the procedure 
remain national and if only limited instances – namely the 
decisional ones – are in the hands of the central level of the 
Office? Why upgrade to the European level only the power to 
take relevant decisions, when the grounds, requirements and 
procedures for those decisions are established mainly by 
national law?53 
3. Competence  
The Regulation defines the competence of the EPPO by reference to the offences that are 
included in the Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means 
of criminal law (‘PIF Directive’),54 i.e. fraud in respect of revenues and expenditure, 
misappropriation, active and passive corruption that damages or is likely to damage the Union’s 
financial interests, and money laundering of property derived from PIF offences, as well as 
inchoate offences (incitement, aiding and abetting, and attempt to commit PIF offences). It has 
been noted that there is a degree of uncertainty as the said offences will be those resulting 
from the implementation of the Directive by member states, which may result in divergent 
                                                     
51 Article 6(1) of the Commission’s proposal. 
52 Article 6(4) of the Commission’s proposal. 
53 Giuffrida (2017b), p. 31. 
54 Directive (EU) 2017/1731 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the fight against fraud to the Union’s 
financial interests by means of criminal law, OJ L198/29, 28.7.2017.  
The nuts and bolts of the 
procedure remain national and 
only limited decisional instances 
are in the hands of the central 
Office. It remains to be seen 
whether the EPPO can reach 
guarantee homogenous and 
effective protection of the EU 
budget. 
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criminalisation approaches.55 The Directive is expected to 
introduce a “very minimalistic degree of minimum 
harmonisation”,56 so that the European panorama of 
substantive criminal law will remain fragmented. This could 
hamper the effectiveness of EPPO investigations and 
prosecutions, which will have to cope – even in the framework 
of a single case – with a variety of substantive criminal 
legislations.57 
The EPPO is also competent for crimes that are “inextricably 
linked” to PIF offences.58 The guiding principle is that the EPPO will be competent for 
inextricably linked offences when the PIF offence is punished with a penalty that is as serious 
as, or more serious than, the one provided for the inextricably linked crime. This further EPPO 
competence gave rise to criticism during the negotiations, because it was seen as a way to 
further erode national sovereignty, allowing the EPPO to exercise its powers beyond the limited 
field of PIF offences. Nevertheless, it is appropriate that this provision has not been removed 
from the text since it is in the interest of justice that a single prosecuting office carries out 
investigations on crimes that are closely interwoven.  
Even more controversial was the inclusion in the scope of the 
Directive (and thus within the mandate of the EPPO) of VAT 
fraud, objected to by member states but supported by the 
Commission and the European Parliament. After the Court of 
Justice sent a very strong signal in its ruling in Taricco, 
confirming that VAT fraud falls within the scope of the third-
pillar fraud Convention which the new Directive replaces,59 a 
compromise was found in the Council: the PIF Directive applies 
to – and the EPPO will be competent for – VAT fraud that is connected with the territory of two 
or more member states and involves a total damage of at least €10 million.60 The two 
mentioned requirements – entity of total damage and cross-border nature of VAT fraud – show 
a very limited willingness of member states to lose their control over the matter.  
This is further confirmed by the fact that a visible federal element introduced by the 
Commission in its draft, namely the exclusive competence of the EPPO on PIF offences, has 
been replaced by a ‘priority’ competence of the Office, backed up by a right to evocation.61 By 
                                                     
55 See, among the many, Flore (2015), p. 302.  
56 Vervaele (2014), p. 97. See also Sicurella (2016), pp. 124ff. 
57 Ligeti (2013), p. 82.  
58 Article 22(3). 
59 Case C-105/14, Taricco and Others, judgment of 8 September 2015, para. 41.  
60 Art 2(2) of the PIF Directive. Recital 4 of the PIF Directive explains that “[t]he notion of total damage refers to 
the estimated damage that results from the entire fraud scheme, both to the financial interests of the Member 
States concerned and to the Union, excluding interest and penalties”. 
61 See Recital 58 on priority competence and Article 27 on the right of evocation. 
The crimes for which the EPPO is 
competent are regulated in a 
recently adopted directive. Since 
substantive European criminal law 
is likely to remain fragmented, 
EPPO investigations and 
prosecutions will have to cope with 
a variety of substantive criminal 
legislations. 
After lengthy debates, member 
states have agreed that the EPPO 
is also competent for VAT fraud 
that it is connected with the 
territory of two or more member 
states and involves a total damage 
of at least €10 million. 
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granting the EPPO exclusive competence, the Commission sent a strong signal to member 
states that it is only the EPPO that is responsible and competent for the investigation and 
prosecution of the ‘European Union’ offences associated with fraud against the Union budget.62 
On the contrary, priority competence and right to evocation 
imply that, if the EPPO becomes aware of the fact that an 
investigation in respect of an offence falling within its mandate 
is already undertaken by national authorities, it will consult 
with the latter authorities and will thereafter decide whether 
to open its own investigation and request the competent 
authorities to transfer the proceedings to it.63  
Finally, Article 86(4) TFEU allows for an extension of the material scope of the EPPO so as to 
cover “serious crime having a cross-border dimension”. Such a decision to broaden the 
competence of the Office must be taken by the European Council acting unanimously, after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament and after consulting the Commission.64 The 
option laid down in Article 86(4) TFEU was not discussed during 
the recently concluded negotiations on the EPPO Regulation, 
due to the reluctance of member states to entrust the EPPO 
with such a broad mandate. Yet, such an enlargement of the 
Office’s competence has been supported by the European 
Parliament,65 and advocated especially following the terrorist 
attacks in Europe in 2015 and 2016.66 Lastly, in the recent 
“State of the Union 2017”, the President of the European 
Commission anticipated that the Commission would table a 
Communication on the extension of the Office’s tasks on terrorism in September 2018.67 
Likewise, in his speech at the Sorbonne University in late September 2017, French President 
Emmanuel Macron included the extension of the EPPO’s competence to transnational 
terrorism among his proposals for relaunching the European Union.68  
                                                     
62 Art 11(4) of the Commission’s proposal. 
63 Article 27(1), (3), (4), and (5).  
64 Article 86(4) TFEU.  
65 European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2016 on the fight against corruption and follow-up of the CRIM 
resolution (2015/2110(INI)), P8_TA (2016) 0403, para. 54. 
66 For further references see Grasso and Giuffrida (2018, forthcoming).  
67 European Commission, “State of the Union 2017. Roadmap for a more united, stronger and more democratic 
Union”, 13 September 2017. 
68 “Les principales propositions d’Emmanuel Macron pour relancer le projet européen”, Le Monde, 27 September 
2017 (www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2017/09/26/les-principales-propositions-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-
relancer-le-projet-europeen_5191799_3214.html).  
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4. Rights of suspects and accused persons 
The Regulation provides three different levels of protection of the rights of persons involved in 
the proceedings of the EPPO.69 First, suspects and accused persons will have the procedural 
rights available to them under the applicable national law.70 Such a regulation of defence rights 
on the basis of domestic law is in line with the ‘hybrid’ 
national/European nature of the EPPO.71 The obvious 
downside is that, in cross-border cases, the suspect will be 
required to cope with a number of different rules concerning 
his/her rights, so that it could become rather difficult to 
organise an effective defence strategy.72 
With a view to tempering similar consequences, the Regulation 
provides for two further levels of protection – at EU level – of 
the rights of persons involved in the activities of the EPPO. First, the Regulation requires that 
any suspected or accused person in the criminal proceedings of the EPPO shall, “at a 
minimum”,73 have those procedural rights provided for in Union law, including the directives 
on procedural rights adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in accordance with 
Article 82(2) TFEU.74 In particular, the Regulation refers to the Directive on the right to 
interpretation and translation;75 the Directive on the right to information and access to the case 
materials;76 the Directive on the right to access to a lawyer;77 the Directive on the right to 
remain silent and the right to be presumed innocent;78 and the Directive on legal aid.79 The 
directives can enhance the protection of fundamental rights during the proceedings of the 
EPPO in different ways: a number of key provisions conferring rights in the directives have 
direct effect; the Commission has full powers to monitor the implementation of these directives 
by member states and has the power to introduce infringement proceedings before the Court 
of Justice if it considers that the directives have not been implemented adequately; national 
criminal procedural law must be applied and interpreted in compliance and conformity with 
the directives; and, finally, the implementation of the directives must take place in compliance 
with the Charter.80  
                                                     
69 See more in Mitsilegas and Giuffrida (2018, forthcoming). 
70 Article 41(3).  
71 Satzger (2015), p. 74. 
72 Kaiafa-Gbandi (2015), pp. 245-246. 
73 Article 41(2).  
74 Ibid.  
75 OJ L280/1, 26.10.2010. 
76 OJ L142/1, 1.6.2012. 
77 OJ L294/1, 6.11.2013. 
78 OJ L65/1, 11.3.2016. 
79 OJ L297/1, 4.11.2016. 
80 See more in Mitsilegas (2017b), pp. 201-214. 
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Although the reference to the directives is welcome, most of 
their provisions represent a compromise among the member 
states. Therefore, the content of the rights provided therein 
can be sometimes quite broad and vague, with the 
consequence that the impact of the directives on national legal 
systems risks being all in all quite limited: this means that 
“suspects and accused will continue to be subject to different 
standards depending on the applicable national law”.81 
Finally, the third level of protection of human rights is 
represented by the Charter of Fundamental Rights.82 The applicability of the Charter to the 
activities of the EPPO is not contentious.83 The provisions of the Charter are indeed addressed 
to a broad range of EU entities (“institutions, bodies, offices and agencies”),84 which include the 
EPPO. Some of the Charter’s rights have been regulated in more detail in the above-mentioned 
directives (e.g. presumption of innocence), whereas others are still 
not regulated at the level of EU legislation. This is the case, for 
instance, of the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal 
proceedings for the same criminal offence – enshrined in Article 50 
of the Charter – which could be endangered in the context of the 
EPPO’s investigations, since there could be risks of double prosecution both at national and at 
supranational level. Thus, the Regulation provides that if the EPPO “decides to exercise its 
competence, the competent national authorities shall not exercise their own competence in 
respect of the same criminal conduct”.85 Likewise, the Regulation also prohibits OLAF to open 
parallel administrative investigations into the same facts where the EPPO decides to open a 
case.86  
5. Judicial review of acts and decisions of the EPPO 
Notwithstanding the nature of the EPPO as a European Union body and in line with the 
Commission’s draft, the Regulation provides for the competence of national courts to rule on 
the “[p]rocedural acts of the EPPO that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third 
parties”.87 The Court of Justice will instead have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings 
concerning: i) the validity of procedural acts of the EPPO, “insofar as such question of validity 
is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State directly on the basis of Union law”;88 
                                                     
81 Weyembergh and Brière (2016), p. 35. Further concerns arise with regard to the costs of defence, which could 
be rather high in cross-border cases: see also Faletti (2017), p. 25. 
82 See Articles 5(1) and 41(1).  
83 See, among the many, Meij (2015), pp. 103-105; Nieto Martín (2015), pp. 315 ff. 
84 Article 51(1) of the Charter (emphasis added). 
85 Article 25(1).  
86 Article 101(2).  
87 Article 42(1).  
88 Article 42(2)(a).  
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adopted directives on procedural 
safeguards, but this can only 
partially mitigate the fact that 
individuals concerned by the 
investigations of the EPPO enjoy 
different treatment according to 
the applicable legislation. 
The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights applies during the 
proceedings of the EPPO. 
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ii) “the interpretation or the validity of provisions of Union law”,89 including the Regulation; and 
iii) the interpretation of the Articles of the Regulation delimiting the material competence of 
the EPPO.90  
Furthermore, departing from the Commission’s draft on this 
point, the Regulation provides that Court of Luxembourg shall 
be competent to review the decisions of the EPPO to dismiss a 
case, “in so far as they are contested directly on the basis of 
Union law”.91 Despite this improvement, the final text still 
envisages a very limited role for the Court of Justice, since the 
judicial review of the acts of the EPPO will be mostly carried out 
at national level. The treatment of the EPPO as a national body 
for the purposes of judicial review disregards the fact that EPPO acts and decisions are adopted 
by an EU body, with the consequence that the Regulation creates a European agency lying 
outside European judicial control.92  
The Commission justified this exclusion on the basis of the “special nature” of the EPPO.93 
However, if anything, the specificity of the EPPO in relation to other EU agencies – which 
consists of the fact that the EPPO is an operational body whose action has the potential to 
affect significantly fundamental rights across the EU – render EU judicial review even more 
imperative. Moreover, the possibilities allowed by the Treaty of Lisbon for specific rules 
concerning judicial review of EU agencies in general, and the EPPO in particular,94 do not mean 
that these rules can entail the total exclusion of EU judicial review for EU agencies, including 
the EPPO. The exclusion of such a review would be a direct attack on the rule of law in the 
European Union and would challenge the obligation of the EU to uphold fundamental rights as 
enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter, in particular 
Articles 47 and 49 of the Charter. Exclusion of EU judicial review of the EPPO would be 
particularly hard to reconcile with the right to effective judicial protection, which has assumed 
a central role in EU constitutional law in recent years, in particular after judicial developments 
in Kadi II.95 In the latter judgment, the Court of Justice made express reference to the need for 
the European judiciary to ensure the full review, in principle, of the lawfulness of all Union acts 
                                                     
89 Article 42(2)(b).  
90 Article 42(2)(c). 
91 Article 42(3) (emphasis added). 
92 Mitsilegas (2015), pp. 78–84, upon which this section draws.  
93 Commission’s proposal, p. 5. 
94 Article 263, fifth paragraph TFEU:  “Acts setting up bodies, offices and agencies of the Union may lay down 
specific conditions and arrangements concerning actions brought by natural or legal persons against acts of these 
bodies, offices or agencies intended to produce legal effects in relation to them”; Article 86(3) TFEU: “The 
regulations referred to in paragraph 1 shall determine the general rules applicable to the European Public 
Prosecutor's Office…as well as…the rules applicable to the judicial review of procedural measures taken by it in 
the performance of its functions”. 
95 Joined Cases C‑ 584/10 P, C‑ 593/10 P and C‑ 595/10 P, European Commission v. Kadi, judgment of 18 July 2013.  
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in the light of fundamental rights and mentioned in particular the respect for the rights of the 
defence and the right to effective judicial protection as enshrined in the Charter. 
The Commission further justified the regime of judicial review at stake in light of the need to 
respect the principle of subsidiarity. However, this approach rests on a misunderstanding of 
the application of the principle of subsidiarity. The subsidiarity test to be met is whether the 
European Union level is the right level of legislative action with regard to the establishment of 
the EPPO to achieve the stated legislative objectives.  The question of judicial review is a meta-
question concerning the functioning of the EPPO, which should arise after the decision on 
whether the establishment of an EPPO per se meets the requirements of the subsidiarity test. 
The issue of the judicial review of the EPPO can be viewed from three different but interrelated 
perspectives. First, one can distinguish between acts and decisions of the EPPO in its centralised 
functions on the one hand and under its decentralised formations on the other. Yet the 
centralised/decentralised distinction is difficult to make, in particular in light of the additional 
layers of the EPPO structure introduced during the negotiations. The second perspective is to 
distinguish between judicial review of different types of act adopted by the EPPO – with pre-
prosecution acts (e.g. investigation acts) being left to national courts to deal with, while 
decisions on prosecution could be subject to EU judicial review. However, this distinction, as 
well as that put forward by the first perspective mentioned above, would disregard the fact 
that both investigation and prosecution decisions are taken by the same EU body whose acts 
should in principle be subject to EU judicial review. The third perspective would be to 
distinguish in terms of applicable law, with EPPO acts and decisions to which EU law applies 
being subject to EU judicial scrutiny, and acts and decisions to which national law applies being 
subject only to national judicial review. However, this perspective would also disregard the 
European Union nature of the EPPO and of the acts and decisions adopted by this body, and 
could lead to adverse consequences with regard to legal certainty as to which acts or decisions 
would qualify as ‘national’ for the purposes of judicial review.  
European Union judicial review should thus have applied as 
extensively as possible to the acts and decisions of the EPPO. A 
key way to achieve this objective would be the use of the action 
of annulment under Article 263 TFEU. According to Article 263, 
fourth paragraph TFEU, any natural or legal person may 
institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person 
or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against 
a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does 
not entail implementing measures. The Court of Justice has interpreted the standing criteria 
for natural and legal persons as applying if the binding legal effects of the contested act are 
capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in its legal 
position. It is self-evident that the standing criteria under Article 263, fourth paragraph TFEU 
will apply to EPPO acts and decisions, which may have profound consequences for the 
fundamental rights of suspects and accused persons. 
The choice to shield EPPO acts and 
decisions from the judicial review 
of the Court of Justice does not sit 
easily with the right to effective 
judicial protection and with the 
basic constitutional principles of 
the EU. 
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Note that not even the decisions of the EPPO on the choice of forum are subject to judicial 
review at EU level. It is known that there is currently no centralised binding mechanism of 
jurisdiction allocation in criminal matters in the European Union. Eurojust has limited not-
binding powers, which have not been expanded or enhanced by the current Proposal for a 
Eurojust Regulation, and the 2009 Framework Decision on prevention and settlement of 
conflicts of jurisdiction merely establishes channels of information exchange and consultation 
between national authorities.96 This shows the reluctance of member states to introduce EU-
level binding rules that would limit their capacity to prosecute.  
Against this backdrop, the choice of introducing some hierarchical criteria for the allocation of 
jurisdiction in the EPPO Regulation is a step forward.97 Yet the fact that the choice of forum is 
not subject to any form of scrutiny at European level is a missed opportunity to enhance the 
legitimacy and efficiency of the forthcoming European prosecution. As seen above, the Court 
of Justice has only been tasked with giving preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of 
the Articles of the Regulation on the Office’s material competence.98 Since the EPPO will mainly 
function on the basis of national laws, the choice of the member state where investigations are 
carried out or where the case has to be brought to justice is of fundamental importance. To 
exclude the judicial review at EU level of EPPO decisions on the 
choice of forum would therefore amount to negating an 
effective remedy against acts that may have significant 
consequences for the protection of fundamental rights, 
including respect of the principle of legality (including 
foreseeability) and equality before the law. Lack of legal 
certainty with regard to the choice of forum decisions at 
national level was found to be in violation of Article 7 ECHR by the European Court of Human 
Rights. In the case of Camilleri v Malta, the Court found that national law providing for two 
different possible punishments depending on the procedure chosen by the Attorney General 
failed to satisfy the foreseeability requirement and to provide effective safeguards against 
arbitrary punishment as provided in Article 7.99 The reasoning of that judgment is likely to apply 
to transnational choice of forum decisions, including decisions by the EPPO, something that 
necessitates not only a clear procedure involving the defendant leading to the decision on the 
allocation of jurisdiction but also effective remedies at European Union level against choice and 
transfer of forum decisions by the EPPO. 
In sum, in order to ensure effective judicial protection of individuals affected by the activities 
of the EPPO, it is necessary to provide for EU judicial review of the EPPO’s investigative acts and 
decisions. It is true that, in practice, it could be unfeasible to extend the jurisdiction of the Court 
to all measures adopted by the EPPO and that, in some instances, it could be more convenient 
                                                     
96 Council Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA of 30 November 2009 on prevention and settlement of conflicts of 
exercise of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings, OJ L328/42, 15.12.2009. 
97 See above, section 2. 
98 Article 42(2)(c).  
99 Application no. 42931/10, Camilleri v. Malta, judgment of 22 January 2013, especially paras. 42-43. 
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to leave such scrutiny to national authorities. However, at least some of the key decisions 
should be reviewed at EU level (e.g. choice of forum). Effective use of the possibilities offered, 
in particular by Articles 263 and 267 TFEU, would have contributed towards both effective 
judicial protection and the development of European Union law in this important field, with the 
full involvement of the Court of Justice and the direction and clarification it may offer to 
national courts in this context. 
6. Relations with the partners 
As for the Office’s relations with the partners, the guiding principle is that the EPPO may 
establish and maintain cooperative relations with EU entities, international organisations, and 
the competent authorities of third countries and member states that do not participate in 
enhanced cooperation,100 and conclude working arrangements with all of them. These 
agreements, however, “may neither form the basis for allowing the exchange of personal data 
nor have legally binding effects on the Union or its Member States”.101 Thus, they will mainly 
concern the exchange of strategic information and other technical details of cooperation. 
As for Europol, the EPPO will be able to obtain, upon request, any relevant information held by 
the agency and may also ask Europol to provide analytical support to a specific investigation.102 
The Regulation instead envisages a closer relation with OLAF, which may be requested by the 
EPPO to: provide information, analysis, expertise, and operational support; facilitate 
coordination of specific actions of the competent national administrative authorities and EU 
bodies; and conduct administrative investigations.103 OLAF will therefore support the activities 
of the EPPO with its complementary (administrative) powers;104 their different nature 
notwithstanding, the Regulation forbids the two bodies from carrying out parallel investigations 
on the same fact.105 Moreover, the EPPO will have indirect access to the information in OLAF’s 
case management system, on the basis of a hit/no hit system.106  
The same access will be granted to the Eurojust’s case management system.107 Confirming the 
“special relationship”108 between the EPPO and Eurojust singled out in Article 86(1) TFEU,109 
the Regulation provides that relations between the two bodies must be based not only on 
                                                     
100 Article 99(1).  
101 Article 99(3). The exchange of personal data shall follow the rules of the ad hoc chapter of the Regulation (see 
Articles 47ff.).  
102 Article 102(2).  
103 Article 101(3).  
104 Article 101(1).  
105 Article 101(2).  
106 Article 101(5).  
107 Article 100(3). 
108 This expression was used in Article 58(1) of the Commission’s proposal but was eventually dropped.  
109 The EPPO shall be established “from Eurojust” (Article 86(1) TFEU). 
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mutual cooperation within their respective mandates110 but also on “the development of 
operational, administrative and management links”.111 The support of Eurojust will be crucial 
in coordinating and facilitating judicial cooperation for serious crime that falls within the remit 
of the EPPO but also involves non-participating member states, or even third countries.112  
Only practice will tell whether the relations of the EPPO with 
Eurojust and the other actors of the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice will yield good results or will complicate the status 
quo. For its nature, powers and mission, the EPPO is radically 
different from Eurojust and Europol, on the one hand, and 
from OLAF, on the other. Yet, it will not be able to carry out 
its investigations and prosecutions without their support, not 
least because of the non-participation of (currently) eight 
member states in enhanced cooperation. Risks of overlap and 
competition thus become even more real than in the past.113 
As for relations with non-participating member states and third countries, the key question is 
whether the EPPO should be regarded as a competent authority for the purpose of 
implementation of the instruments concerning judicial cooperation. In other words, should it 
be allowed to issue and receive requests for mutual legal assistance or extradition? The 
Regulation does not offer a one-size-fits-all answer to this question.  
First, as far as the extradition to third countries is concerned,114 the Regulation simply states 
that the European Delegated Prosecutors will act on behalf of the EPPO and on the basis of 
their national laws. On the contrary, the EPPO can be recognised as the competent authority 
in all the other matters of legal assistance with regard to third countries, according to the 
detailed rules of the Regulation.115  
                                                     
110 Article 100(1). This is stated also in the provision concerning the relations of the EPPO with OLAF (Article 101(1)) 
and, in a more nuanced way, with Europol (Article 102(1)). 
111 Article 100(1). 
112 Article 100(2)(b). 
113 See Weyembergh, Armada and Brière (2014), pp. 57ff. 
114 See Article 59(4) of the Commission’s proposal.  
115 See Article 104.  
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Second, as far as non-participating member states are 
concerned, the Regulation provides that – in the absence of a 
legal instrument expressly regulating the cooperation and 
surrender between the EPPO and non-participating member 
states – member states establishing the EPPO should recognise 
the Office as the competent authority for the purposes of 
implementation of the applicable Union acts on judicial 
cooperation and surrender in their relations with non-
participating member states.116 This means, for instance, that 
the EPPO will in principle be authorised to issue or request to 
issue European Arrest Warrants or European Investigations 
Orders in its relations with non-participating member states. 
Such relations are therefore regulated in a way that should 
guarantee an effective coordination between the competent national authorities and the 
EPPO,117 which should act – at least in that regard – as a truly European body relying on 
European laws without any mediation of national legislation.118 It is worth noting that the 
Council has invited the Commission to “reflect on submitting appropriate proposals in order to 
ensure effective judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the EPPO” and the non-
participating member states.119 
In this frame, it will be interesting to see how the relations between the EPPO and the post-
Brexit United Kingdom will be regulated. Before the vote of 23 June 2016, the European Union 
Committee of the House of Lords had scrutinised the impact of the establishment of the EPPO 
on the UK. Among the other issues, it expressed concerns for some statements of Theresa May, 
at the time Home Secretary, who had declared that “the UK might not be legally obliged to 
respond to requests for assistance from the EPPO”.120 The Committee noted that such an 
uncooperative attitude could risk making the UK a “safe haven for illegally obtained EU 
funds”.121  
In the aftermath of the 2016 referendum, the same Committee issued a report on the future 
EU-UK security and police cooperation, where no relevant remarks on the EPPO can be found. 
However, as for relations with Europol, the Committee highlighted that treating the UK as a 
third country with which the agency would have to conclude an ordinary operational 
agreement “would not be sufficient to meet the UK’s needs”;122 similar conclusions – although 
slightly more nuanced – are drawn for the future relations with Eurojust.123 The policy paper 
                                                     
116 Article 105(3). 
117 Weyembergh and Brière (2016), p. 47. 
118 Giuffrida (2017b), pp. 35-37. 
119 Council doc. 9896/17 ADD 1 COR 1, 7 June 2017. 
120 European Union Committee of the House of Lords (2014), p. 28 (emphasis added).  
121 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
122 European Union Committee of the House of Lords (2016), p. 20 (emphasis added). 
123 Ibid., p. 24. 
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recently published by the government on security, law enforcement and criminal justice does 
not give any significant guidance either: the EPPO is not mentioned at all and, as far as the 
cooperation with the agencies is concerned, it is only mentioned that the UK will be seeking a 
“bespoke relationship” with Europol.124 
In sum, handling relations between the UK and EU agencies – 
including the EPPO – in the same way as ordinary relations with 
a third country seems unsatisfactory for the UK, which will 
unavoidably enjoy a reduced degree of participation in these 
bodies. On the other hand, in the light of the fundamental 
contribution given by this country to the development of 
Europol and Eurojust, the EU will lose a key player in the field. 
Future cooperation will depend on the extent to which the UK 
will be deemed to comply with key EU law standards, including 
– in particular in cases involving the exchange of personal data – an assessment by EU 
institutions that the UK provides an adequate level of data protection.125 In any case, from a 
legal standpoint, the UK will be a third country for all intents and purposes, so that the 
cooperation between the EPPO and the UK should follow the rules laid down in the Regulation 
and briefly summarised above.  
7. Conclusion 
The EPPO Regulation is probably the boldest and most ambitious instrument of EU (criminal) 
law adopted thus far. It is also one of the most contested. The Commission produced a highly 
innovative vision of centralised prosecution at EU level, with echoes of federalism in its use of 
concepts such as the exclusive competence of the EPPO. Unsurprisingly, this text met the 
resistance of national parliaments and governments, and an enhanced cooperation involving 
20 member states eventually replaced the Commission’s federal vision with the usual 
intergovernmental, collegiate model that characterises a number of current EU judicial 
cooperation structures, in particular Eurojust.126  
The EPPO will indeed be organised at both a central level and a decentralised level. The latter 
consists of the European Delegated Prosecutors, who will be part of national prosecution 
services and, simultaneously, members of the EPPO. This ‘double hatted’ status allows the 
European Delegated Prosecutors to exercise all the ordinary powers they have as national 
prosecutors, yet it raises concerns about the actual independence they will enjoy when dealing 
with the crimes affecting the Union’s financial interests (so-called ‘PIF offences’). The European 
Delegated Prosecutors will carry out the investigations under the direction of the Permanent 
Chambers and the supervision of European Prosecutors. Together with the College, which will 
not intervene on individual cases, and the European Chief Prosecutor, who will be the head of 
                                                     
124 HM Government, “Security, law enforcement and criminal justice. A future partnership paper”, 2017, p. 19. 
125 Mitsilegas (2017a). 
126 Mitsilegas (2016), pp. 32-33. 
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the Office, the Permanent Chambers and supervising European Prosecutors form the central 
level of the EPPO (section 2). The multiple layers provided for in the Regulation sit very well 
with the will of the member states to preserve their sovereignty as much as possible on the one 
hand, but on the other they run counter to the need of the EPPO to function in a smooth and 
efficient way. Moreover, the gap between the level where most of the decisions are taken (EU 
level/Permanent Chamber) and the level where actions have to be taken (national 
level/European Delegated Prosecutors) poses several questions about the expected 
effectiveness of the body (section 2.1).  
The boundaries of the EPPO’s competence will be set out by national laws. Crimes affecting the 
EU budget will indeed be defined by national legislations, which are expected to be harmonised 
to a limited extent by the recently adopted PIF Directive: the persistent discrepancies among 
the national criminal justice systems could therefore represent a further obstacle to the 
effectiveness of the activities of the EPPO. After lengthy debates in the Council, it has been 
agreed that the Office will also be competent with regard to VAT fraud that is linked to the 
territories of two or more member states and involves a total damage of at least €10 million. 
Although at least three years are needed before the EPPO is able to start its activities, strong 
support for the enlargement of its competence to cases of cross-border terrorism has already 
emerged (section 3).  
The protection of the rights of suspects and accused persons mostly relies on national laws as 
well. As a consequence, individuals concerned by the investigations of the EPPO will receive 
different treatment according to the applicable national law and, in cross-border cases, this 
patchwork scenario can have adverse consequences on the right to organise an effective 
defence. The reliance on the rights provided in the Charter and in the recent directives on 
procedural safeguards can only partially mitigate the problems raised by the inherently hybrid 
structure of the EPPO, a body which will be partially European and partially based on national 
criminal justice systems (section 4).  
Such a hybrid nature of the EPPO also justifies, in the Commission’s and member states’ view, 
the regime of judicial review laid down in the Regulation: the acts of the EPPO intended to 
produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties will be revised by national courts, whereas the 
scrutiny of the Court of Justice has been limited to the decisions of the Office to dismiss a case. 
The Court can give preliminary rulings on the validity of procedural acts of the EPPO, in so far 
as such a question of validity is raised directly on the basis of Union law. These rules do not sit 
easily with the right to effective judicial protection enshrined in the Charter and with the basic 
constitutional principles of the EU: acts and decisions of an EU body that may have profound 
consequences for fundamental rights will indeed be shielded from EU judicial scrutiny. The lack 
of judicial review, at EU level, of the choice of forum is especially striking (section 5).  
Finally, the EPPO’s relations with its partners (EU bodies, third countries, international 
organisations and non-participating member states) will be mostly regulated by working 
arrangements to be concluded by the Office. A specific instrument can also be adopted to 
ensure effective judicial cooperation between the EPPO and the non-participating member 
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states. The privileged partner of the EPPO will be Eurojust, and the close relations between the 
two bodies might have called for a common location. However, the non-participation of the 
Netherlands in the enhanced cooperation led to the placing of the EPPO in Luxembourg. Once 
the EPPO is established, whether further overlap and competition among EU bodies acting in 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice will occur can be evaluated (section 6).  
The EPPO represents an extremely important step forward on the road to increasing integration 
and its establishment is underpinned by an obvious and praiseworthy reason, namely to better 
protect the EU budget and, consequently, European taxpayers. Yet some of its features raise 
concerns because the Office is empowered to adopt relevant decisions without relying on a 
homogenous, European corpus of rules.127 In the complex and multi-level scenario envisaged 
by the Regulation, where EU and national law are inextricably linked, it is crucial that issues 
related to the effective protection of human rights are not left behind. Indeed, it is ensuring 
the effective protection of fundamental rights that will confer legitimacy on any EU project to 
further integrate the area of prosecution. This protection will also address issues of lack of trust 
between EU member states and between member states and the European Union, and create 
the conditions for a wider acceptance of the EPPO project by the European public. 
  
                                                     
127 Giuffrida (2017c), p. 40. 
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